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Abstract
Recommender systems are widely used in online applications since they enable
personalized service to the users. The underlying collaborative filtering tech-
niques work on user’s data which are mostly privacy sensitive and can be misused
by the service provider. To protect the privacy of the users, we propose to encrypt
the privacy sensitive data and generate recommendations by processing them un-
der encryption. With this approach, the service provider learns no information
on any user’s preferences or the recommendations made. The proposed method
is based on homomorphic encryption schemes and secure multiparty computa-
tion (MPC) techniques. The overhead of working in the encrypted domain is
minimized by packing data as shown in the complexity analysis.
Keywords: Recommender systems, user privacy, secure multiparty computation, ho-
momorphic encryption, data packing.
1 Introduction
In the last decade, we have experienced phenomenal progress in information and com-
munication technologies. Cheaper, more powerful, less power consuming devices and
high bandwidth communication lines enabled us to create a new virtual world in which
people mimic activities from their daily lives without the limitations imposed by the
physical world. Online shopping, banking, communicating and much more have be-
come common for millions of people [1].
Personalization is a common approach to attract even more people to online ser-
vices. Instead of making general suggestions for the users of the system, the system
can suggest personalized services targeting only a particular user based on his pref-
erences [2]. Since the personalization of the services offers high profits to the service
providers and poses interesting research challenges, research for generating recommen-
dations, also known as collaborative filtering, attracts attention both from academia
and industry.
The techniques for generating recommendations for users strongly rely on the infor-
mation gathered from the user. This information can be provided by the user himself
as in profiles or the service provider can observe user’s actions like click logs. On one
hand, more information on the user helps the system to improve the accuracy of the
recommendations. On the other hand, the information on the users creates a severe
privacy risk since there is no solid guarantee for the service provider not to misuse
the user’s data. It is often seen that whenever a user enters the system, the service
provider claims the ownership of the information provided by the user and authorizes
itself to distribute the data to third parties for its own benefits [13].
In this paper, we propose a cryptographic solution for preserving the privacy of
users in a recommender system. In particular, the privacy-sensitive data of the users
are kept encrypted and the service provider generates recommendations by processing
encrypted data. The cryptographic protocol developed for this purpose is based on
homomorphic encryption [3] and secure multiparty computation (MPC) techniques
[14]. While the homomorphic property is used for realizing linear operations, protocols
based on MPC techniques are developed for non-linear operations (e.g. finding the
most similar users). The overhead introduced by working in the encrypted domain is
reduced considerably by data packing as shown in complexity analysis.
2 Related Work
In [4], Canny proposes a system where the private user data is encrypted and rec-
ommendations are generated by applying an iterative procedure based on conjugate
gradient algorithm. The algorithm computes a characterization matrix of the users in a
subspace and generates recommendations by calculating reprojections in the encrypted
domain. Since the algorithm is iterative, it takes many rounds for convergence and in
each round users need to participate in an expensive decryption procedure which is
based on a threshold scheme where a significant portion of the users are assumed to be
online and honest. The output of each iteration, which is the characterization matrix,
is available in clear. In [5], Canny proposes a method to protect the privacy of users
based on a probabilistic factor analysis model by using a similar approach as in [4].
While Canny works with encrypted user data, Polat and Du suggest to protect the
privacy of users by using randomization techniques [11, 12]. In their paper, they blind
the user data with a known random distribution assuming that in aggregated data this
randomization cancels out and the result is a good estimation of the intended outcome.
The success of this method highly depends on the number of users participating in the
computation since for the system to work, the number of users need to be in vast
amounts. This creates a trade-off between accuracy/correctness of the recommenda-
tions and the number of users in the system. Moreover, the outcome of the algorithm
is also available to the server who constitutes a privacy threat to the users. Finally,
the randomization techniques are believed to be highly insecure [15].
3 Generating Recommendations
A centralized system for generating recommendations is a common approach in e-
commerce applications. To generate recommendations for user A, the server follows
a two-step procedure. In the first step, the server searches for users similar to user
A. Each user in the system is represented by a preference vector which is usually
composed of ratings for each item within a certain range. Finding similar users is
based on computing similarity measures between users’ preference vectors. Pearson
correlation is a common similarity measure (Eq. 1) for two users with preference vectors
VA = (v(A,0), . . . , v(A,M−1))
T and VB = (v(B,0), . . . , v(B,M−1))
T , respectively, where M is
the number of items and v¯ represents the average value of the vector v.
simA,B =
∑M−1
i=0 (v(A,i) − vA) · (v(B,i) − vB)√∑M−1
i=0 (v(A,i) − vA)
2 ·
∑M−1
i=0 (v(B,i) − vB)
2
. (1)
Once the similarity measure for each user is computed, the server proceeds with
the second step. In this step, the server chooses the first L users with similarity values
above a threshold δ and averages their ratings. These average ratings are then presented
as recommendations to user A.
In e-commerce applications the number of items offered to users are usually in the
order of hundreds or thousands. Apart from many smart ways of determining the
likes and dislikes of users for the items, we assume the users are asked to rate the items
explicitly with integer values in the range of [0, K]. Regarding the vast number of items
and users’ rating behavior, the data matrix is usually highly sparse, meaning that most
of the items are not rated. Finding similar users in a sparse dataset can easily lead
the server to generate inaccurate recommendations. To cope with this problem, one
approach is to introduce a small set of items that is rated by most users. Such a base
set can be explicitly given to the users or implicitly chosen by the server from the
most commonly rated items. Having a small set of items that is rated by most users,
the server can compute similarities between users more confidently, resulting in more
accurate recommendations. Therefore, we assume that the user preference vector V is
split into two parts: the first part consists of R elements that are rated by most of the
users and the second part contains M −R partly rated items that the user would like
to get recommendations on [2].
4 Cryptographic Primitives and Security Model
We use encryption to protect user data against the service provider and other users.
A special class of cryptosystems, namely homomorphic cryptosystems, allows us to
process the data in the encrypted form. We chose the Paillier cryptosystem [10] as it
is additively homomorphic meaning that the product of two encrypted values [a] and
[b], where [·] denotes the encryption function, corresponds to a new encrypted message
whose decryption yields the sum of a and b as [a] · [b] = [a + b]. As a consequence of
the additive homomorphism, any ciphertext [m] raised to the power of a public value c
corresponds to the multiplication of m and c in the encrypted domain: [m]c = [m · c].
In addition to the homomorphism property, the Paillier cryptosystem is semantically
secure implying that each encryption has a random element that results in different
ciphertexts for the same plaintext.
As a part of a cryptographic protocol introduced in Section 6, we use another
additively homomorphic and semantically secure encryption scheme, DGK [7, 6]. The
DGK is replaced with the Paillier cryptosystems in a subprotocol for efficiency reasons.
Due to its much smaller message space, encryption and decryption operations are more
efficient than Paillier cryptosystem.
We use the semi-honest security model, which assumes that all players follow the
protocol steps but are curious and thus keep all messages from previous and current
steps to extract more information than they are allowed to have. Our protocol can be
adapted to the active attacker model by using the ideas in [9] with additional overhead.
5 Privacy-Preserving Recommender System
In this section we propose a protocol based on additively homomorphic encryption
schemes and MPC techniques. In particular the service provider, i.e. the server, receives
the encrypted rating vector of user A and sends it to the other users in the system
who can then compute the similarity value on their own by using the homomorphism
property of the encryption scheme. Once the users compute the similarity values, they
are sent to the server. After that, the server and user A runs a protocol to determine the
similarity values that are above a threshold δ. The server, being unaware of the number
users with a similarity value above a threshold and their identities, accumulates the
ratings of all users in the encrypted domain. Then, the encrypted sum is sent to user A
along with the encrypted number of similarities above the threshold, L. UserA decrypts
the sum and L and, computes the average values, obtaining the recommendations. Each
step of the proposed protocol is detailed in the following sections.
5.1 Key Generation and Preprocessing
Any user in the system who wants to get recommendations generates personal public
key pairs for the Paillier and the DGK cryptosystems. We assume that the public keys
of the users are available publicly.
Since the Pearson correlation given in (1) for user A and B can be also written as:
simA,B =
R−1∑
i=0
(v(A,i) − vA)√∑R−1
i=0 (v(A,i) − vA)
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C1
·
(v(B,i) − vB)√∑R−1
i=0 (v(B,i) − vB)
2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
C2
, (2)
the terms C1 and C2 can be easily computed by users A and B, respectively. Each
user computes a vector from which the mean is subtracted and normalized. Since the
elements of the vector are real numbers and cryptosystems are only defined on integer
values, they are all scaled by a parameter f and rounded to the nearest integer result-
ing in a new vector V ′i = (v
′
(i,0), . . . , v
′
(i,R−1))
T whose elements are now k-bit positive
integers. Note that the threshold value δ should also be adjusted accordingly.
5.2 Computing Similarity Measures
The similarity value between user A and any other user B is computed over the rat-
ing vectors of size R. The elements of the user vector V ′A = (v
′
(A,0), . . . , v
′
(A,R−1)) are
encrypted individually by using the public key of the user A. Then, the encrypted
vector [V ′A]pkA is sent to the server. The server then sends the encrypted vector to the
other users in the system. Any user B who receives the encrypted vector [V ′A]pkA can
compute the encrypted similarity as follows:
[simA,B] = [
R−1∑
i=0
v′(A,i) · v
′
(B,i)] = [v
′
(A,0) · v
′
(B,0) + . . .+ v
′
(A,R−1) · v
′
(B,R−1)]
= [v′(A,0)]
v′
(B,0) · [v′(A,1)]
v′
(B,1) · . . . · [v′(A,R−1)]
v′
(B,R−1) =
R−1∏
i=0
[v′(A,i)]
v′
(B,i) . (3)
Note that we omit the encryption key pkA above and in the rest of the paper for the
sake of readability. The computed similarity value is then sent back to the server in
encrypted form.
5.3 Finding the Most Similar Users
Upon receiving similarity values from users, the server initiates a cryptographic protocol
with user A to determine the most similar users whose similarity values are above a
public threshold δ. The protocol receives N encrypted similarity values and outputs
en encrypted vector [ΓA] = ([γ(A,0)], [γ(A,1)], . . . , [γ(A,N−1)]). The elements of this vector
γ(A,i) are either an encryption of 1, if the the similarity value between user A and user i
is above the threshold δ, or an encryption of 0, otherwise. The details of this protocol
can be found in Section 6.
5.4 Generating Recommendations
After obtaining the vector [ΓA], the server can generate the recommendation for user A.
For this purpose, the server sends [γ(A,i)] to the i
th user in the system. User i, referred
as user B, can raise [γ(A,B)] to the power of each rating he has left in his ratings vector
to obtain another encrypted vector [Φ(A,B)] = ([φ(A,R)], [φ(A,R+1)], . . . , [φ(A,M−1)]) where
φ(A,j) = [γ(A,B) · v
′
(B,j)] = [γ(A,B)]
v′
(B,j) for j = R to M − 1. Notice that user B does not
know the content of γ(A,B). The resulting vector [Φ(A,B)] is either the encrypted rating
vector of user B or a vector of encrypted 0’s. Vector [Φ(A,B)] then is sent to the server
to be accumulated with other vectors from every user.
The above procedure can be improved in order to minimize the computational and
communication cost. Instead of raising [γ(A,B)] to the power of each rating, the ratings
can be represented in a compact form and then used as an exponent:
v′(B,R)|v
′
(B,R+1)| . . . |v
′
(B,M−1), (4)
where | represents the concatenation operation. Assuming that each v′(B,j) is k-bits and
N of such vectors are to be accumulated by the server, where N is the number of users
participating in the protocol, each compartment should have a bit size of k + log(N).
Thus, packing is achieved by the following formula:
v′′B =
M−R∑
j=0
2j(k+log(N)) · v′(B,j+R). (5)
By packing values, the communication cost reduces significantly as we obtain a packed
value rather than a vector of encrypted vectors. Packing also reduces the number
of exponentiations which is a costly operation in the encrypted domain, introducing
a gain in computation. However, depending on the message space of the encryption
scheme, n, and the number of ratings, M − R, it may not be possible to pack all
values in one encryption. The number of values that can fit into one encryption is
T = n/(k + log(N)). Therefore, we may need S = ⌈M −R/T ⌉ encryptions.
Once user B packs his ratings to obtain v′′B, he can compute [Φ(A,B)] as follows:
[
Φ(A,B)
]
= [γ(A,B)]
v′′
B =


[v′′B] if γ(A,B) = 1
[0] if γ(A,B) = 0,
(6)
and sends [Φ(A,B)] to the server. Upon receiving [Φ(A,i)] values from all users, the server
accumulates them:
[ΦA] =
N∏
i=0
[Φ(A,i)] = [
N∑
i=0
Φ(A,i)]. (7)
Notice that the result will be equal to the sum of ratings of the users who have similarity
values above threshold δ. The server also accumulates the [γ(A,i)] values to obtain the
number of users above the threshold:
[L] =
N∏
i=0
[γ(A,i)] = [
N∑
i=0
γ(A,i)]. (8)
These two values, [ΦA] and [L] are then sent to user A. After decrypting, user A
decomposes ΦA and divides each extracted value by L, obtaining the average ratings
of L users. This concludes our protocol.
An important observation at this point is the value of L. If L = 0, the user can
notify the server to repeat the second step of the protocol with a new threshold. If
L = 1, the user obtains exactly the same ratings vector of some user but he does not
have the identity of that particular user.
6 Cryptographic Protocol for Finding Similar Users
Finding similar users is based on comparing the similarity value between user A and B,
simA,B, to a public threshold δ. As the similarity value is privacy sensitive and should
be kept secret both from the server and the user, we compare it in the encrypted
domain. For this purpose, we use a comparison protocol that has been introduced
in [8]. The cryptographic protocol in [8] takes two encrypted values, [a] and [b], and
outputs the result λ again in the encrypted form: if a > b [λ = 1], and [λ = 0] otherwise.
For the completeness of the paper, we give a brief description of the protocol. More
explanation and implementation details on the comparison protocol can be found in
[8].
Given the similarity value simA,M and public threshold δ, both of which are ℓ bits,
the most significant bit of the value z = 2ℓ+simA,B−δ is the outcome of the comparison.
However, we need to obtain the most significant bit of z in the encrypted domain. While
the encrypted value [z] can be computed by the server, the most significant bit of [z]
requires running a protocol between the server and user A who has the decryption key.
Note that the similarity value cannot be trusted to the user as it leaks information
about other users in the system. Therefore, the server adds a random value r to z:
[c] = [z+r] and sends it to user A who then decrypts it. Notice that the most significant
bit now can be computed as
[
γ(A,i)
]
= [2−ℓ(c mod 2ℓ − r mod 2ℓ) + α · 2ℓ], (9)
where the last term is necessary depending on the relation between c and r. The
variable α is a single bit representing whether c > r or not. At this point, we convert
the problem of comparing [simA,i] and δ to the problem of comparing c and r which
are owned by the user and the server respectively.
Comparing c and r requires another cryptographic protocol in which the server and
user A evaluate the following formula for each of ℓ bits:
[ei] = [1− ci + ri + 3
ℓ−1∑
j=i+1
cj ⊕ rj], (10)
where ci and ri are the i
th bits of c and r, respectively. The value of ei can be 0 if and
only if c > r, when ci = 0, ri = 1 and the upper part of c and r are the same. After
these computations, the server sends the randomized and shuffled [ei] values to the
user A. User A decrypts them and checks whether there is a zero among the values ei.
Existence of a 0 value indicates that r > c. However, this leaks information about the
comparison of simA,B and δ thus, the server randomizes the direction of the comparison
by replacing 1− ci+ ri in Eq. 10 with −1− ci+ ri at random. User A then returns [α]
which is either [1] or [0] depending on the existence of a 0 among the ei values. The
server can correct the direction of the comparison and obtain the [γ(A,i)] by replacing
α in Eq. 9.
By using this comparison protocol, each similarity value is compared to threshold δ
simultaneously. The outcomes of the comparisons, [ΓA] = ([γ(A,0)], [γ(A,1)], . . . , [γ(A,N−1)]),
are then used in the subsequent steps.
7 Complexity Analysis
The performance of our protocol is mainly determined by the interaction among the
server, and user A, who asks for recommendation, and other users in the system.
In our construction, the server participates in the computation and relays messages
Table 1: Computational complexity.
Server User A User B
Paillier DGK Paillier DGK Paillier DGK
Encryption O(N) O(Nℓ) O(R) O(ℓ) - -
Decryption - - O(1) O(ℓ) - -
Multiplication O(NS) O(Nℓ2) - - O(R) -
Exponentiation - O(Nℓ) - - O(R + S) -
among users. User A, on the other hand, only participates in the protocol in two
stages: 1) when he asks for a recommendation and uploads his encrypted data and 2)
when he receives the encrypted recommendation. Other users help the server with the
recommendation generation.
Round Complexity. Our protocol consists of 5 rounds. The data transfer from
users to the server in the initialization stage is 0.5 round. To determine the similar
users and generating the recommendation, the server needs 4 rounds of interaction.
Notice that during the comparison protocol to obtain [ΓA], all encrypted values are
compared to a public value δ, and all comparisons can be done in parallel. In the
last stage, the server sends the recommendation to user A which requires another 0.5
round. This gives O(1) rounds.
Communication Complexity. The amount of data transferred during the pro-
tocol is primarily influenced by the size of the encrypted data. For user A, the amount
of encrypted data to be transferred is O(R+Nℓ). The server, on the other hand, has
to receive and send O(N(R + S + ℓ)) encrypted data which is heavily influenced by
the data transmission during the comparison of N similarity values. Other users in the
system need to receive and send data in the order of O(R + S).
Computational Complexity. The computational complexity depends on the cost
of operations in the encrypted domain and can be categorized into four classes: en-
cryptions, decryptions, multiplications and exponentiations. In Table 1, we provide the
average numbers for each operation in the Paillier and the DGK cryptosystems. One
exception is for the decryption operation, which is actually a zero-check which is a fast
and less expensive operation compared to original decryption in DGK cryptosystem.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a cryptographic approach for generating recommendations
to the users within online applications. The proposed method is constructed by ho-
momorphic encryption schemes and MPC techniques. As shown in the complexity
analysis, the overhead introduced by working in the encrypted domain is reduced sig-
nificantly by packing data and using the DGK cryptosystem. Unfortunately, we do not
have the chance of comparing our result with previously proposed systems due to space
problems. However, we conclude that our proposal is based on a realistic scenario and
the required technology is not overly demanding compared to the cryptographic tools
like thresholding schemes that other approaches are using [4]. Compared to random-
ization techniques [11, 12], our proposal is provably secure and does not rely on the
number of users in the system.
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